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CORRUPTION MAY WORSEN IN DEMOCRATIZING 
ECONOMIES:  
BUT DON’T LET IT ERODE OUR FAITH IN DEMOCRACY 
 
SHAOMIN LI  
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, USA 
ILAN ALON 
UNIVERSITY OF AGDER, NORWAY 
JUN WU 
SAVANNAH STATE UNIVERSITY, USA 
ABSTRACT 
This commentary is based on a recent study we conducted on the relationship 
between regime type, corruption, and economic development. We build a theory 
that links corruption and regime type to economic growth and test it on 158 
countries, using multiple databases including Polity IV, transparency international, 
the World Bank, and others. We first distinguish three regime types, autocracy 
(dictatorship), anocracy (countries in early stage of democratization), and mature 
democracy. We found that when autocratic countries begin democratize, corruption 
usually gets worse. As the infant democracies mature, corruption decreases.  
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The phenomenal economic performance of China under a dictatorship with 
rampant corruption versus the seemingly economic chaos in some democratizing 
countries has cast a serious doubt on our faith in democracy’s ability to deliver 
economic prosperity and forced us to rethink the effect of corruption on economic 
development.  
 
To better understand this issue, we conducted a study on the relationship 
between corruption, regime type, and economic growth using data from more than 
100 countries between 2008 and 2012 1 .  What we find not only explain why 
democratizing countries may encounter worse corruption and slower economic 
growth, but also provide evidence that democracy can more effectively eradicate 
corruption and sustain economic development, therefore effectively dispelling the 
doubt on whether societies under dictatorship should democratize. 
 
We first distinguish three types of political regimes in order to examine how 
the corruption- economic development relationship varies across them. 
 
Type 1—Autocracy: This is a totalitarian regime, or dictatorship, such as 
Suharto’s Indonesia before the late 1990s or today’s China under the rule of the 
Chinese Communist Party, characterized by a strong dictator or a ruling party that 
wields iron control over society. This type of government controls economic 
activities and uses its control to maximize total bribes, which in turn provide 
incentives for the officials to facilitate business and thus increase GDP. In such a 
regime, the targets of the bribes are clear and the delivery of goods to the briber is 
secure. We call this a “one big mafia” corruption model. For example, if a developer 
bribed Suharto to get his construction project going, Suharto would instruct all 
relevant government departments to approve the project, allowing them to take 
reasonable amounts of bribes in the process. There are about 20 countries that are 
ruled by Autocracy in our sample. 
 
Type 2—Anocracy: this is a regime type when autocracy begins to crack due 
to the social pressure to democratize. The absolute rule of the “one big mafia” 
disintegrates while an efficient and effective democracy has not fully established 
yet, creating opportunities for bureaucrats, or “many small mafias” to monopolize 
power in regions or markets they control. For example, immediately after Suharto 
was overthrown, no dictator could order and coordinate all the departments to give 
greenlights to a project, and each department head would have strong incentive to 
extort as much payment from the developer as possible, making the cost of bribe 
much higher and the probability of getting approvals from all departments much 
lower.  Newly established infant democracies fit this model, such as Russia in the 
1990s or Egypt after the Arab Spring. In Anocracy, turf wars among government 
agencies exacerbate and hinder economic development, until they reach Type 3.  44 
countries are in Anocracy in our study. 




Type 3—Mature Democracy, characterized by governmental checks and 
balances that substantially reduce or minimize monopolies over key government 
services. As an example, there are at least two government agencies that offer key 
government services (e.g., the U.S. passport agencies). While North America and 
Western Europe have long been mature democracies, it has also emerged in other 
parts of the world (e.g., Botswana, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, and Uruguay). 
Compared to the other two regime types, it has the highest economic development 
level and income, and lowest level of corruption. Given the high development and 
income level, the growth rate inevitably will slow down.  The regime type covers 
the largest number of countries: 94 countries are Mature Democracies in our 
research. 
 
Our statistical analyses provide some interesting insights about how regime 
type, corruption, and economic growth interact.  Using the World Bank’s measure 
on control of corruption, we found that the level of corruption in Autocracies, 
Anocracies, and Mature Democracies are 0.41, 0.66, and -0.21, respectively (a high, 
positive number means high corruption).  The five-year average economic growth 
rates are 5.42%, 4.35%, and 2.70% for Autocracies (with per capita income of 
US$8,523), Anocracies (with per capita income of US$5,312), and Mature 
Democracies (with per capita income of US$16,160), respectively.  
 
Putting the two statistics together, an interesting picture emerges: Both 
Autocracies and Anocracies have a high level of corruption. However, Autocracies 
have a high level of economic growth despite the high level of corruption. 
Furthermore, its corruption level is not the highest, which belongs to Anocracies. 
Mature Democracies have the lowest level of corruption and economic growth rate, 
as expected.  
 
Using multiple regression analysis, which allows us to examine how the 
interaction between regime type and corruption affects economic growth while 
controlling other factors that may affect economic growth, we found that the 
interaction between Anocracy and corruption exerts a strong negative effect on 
economic growth—in other words, corruption is the main culprit that hurts the 
economies undergoing the democratic transition. In contrast, we find that the role 
of the interaction between Autocracy and corruption is strongly positive, rather than 
negative as in Anocracies.  Corruption seems to enhance economic growth in 
Autocracy. 
Anecdotal evidence supports our statistical findings. In China, a clear case of 
Autocracy, businesses and government officials have formed a cozy relationship 
with a high level of mutual understanding and protection, in which the officials can 
safely award lucrative projects to a bidder who can offer the highest amount of bribe 
(who usually is also the most efficient, ceteris paribus). However, the recent 
anticorruption campaign in China has undermined the cozy relationship. Officials 
now silently protest the campaign by not approving projects, slowing down the 
economy.  In Russia right after the fall of communism, many small mafias emerged 
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and independently demanded payments from business people seeking approvals, 
making corruption worse and less efficient, as no one small mafia could deliver what 
the business people wanted without the consent of other small mafias. 
 
From the late 1980s to 2008, we witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall which 
ushered Russia and its satellite countries into chaos, the strengthening of communist 
rule after the Tiananmen Square crackdown which was followed by rapid economic 
expansion in China, and the financial meltdown in the advanced democracies and 
free markets. These events seem to have contributed to the rise in popularity that a 
dictatorship is superior to a democracy in terms of economic growth. 
 
Our study shows that this view fails to consider the relationship between regime 
type and corruption, and thus it does not help us understand why infant democracies 
tend to experience economic difficulties. This view is also misleading in its 
conclusion that dictatorship is a superior political system in terms of delivering 
economic growth because it fails to take into consideration the role of corruption 
and its interactions with the regime type. The surge in corruption during transition 
is a by-product and thus should not be used as an excuse for not undergoing 
transition. This is merely a convenient excuse for dictators to suppress 
democratization. 
 
Policy makers in mature democracies and international agencies should 
promote democratization and at the same time they should help those countries 
undergoing transition to limit the period of chaos or Anocracy. In addition, the 
policy makers in transition countries also should make efforts to curb corruption in 
fledgling democracies and to restructure their bureaucracies to minimize 
complementarities (i.e., the “many small mafias” situation) that tend to maximize 
corruption by government agencies. 
1 Ilan Alon, Shaomin Li, and Jun Wu, 2016, “Corruption, Regime Type, and Economic 
Growth,” Public Finance and Management, 16(4) 332-361.  
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